Friday, November 29, 2013

I think the Fed is frustrated, and this speech by Bernanke seems to prove it.

Attached is a speech by Ben Bernanke titled "Communication and Monetary Policy" that he gave to the National Economists Club Annual Dinner on November 19th, 2013. I believe his is a VERY important speech to read and contemplate. Below are some of the things I found particularly interesting.

  • I've read through this speech several times and below are some highlights, but I recommend you read it for yourself. Even though Bernanke will be leaving the Fed at the end of January, I have no doubt he still speaks for the Fed. Thus, I think it's important to try and understand and digest the messages he is delivering.
  • There are two primary messages Bernanke tries to deliver in this speech. First, the Fed Funds rates will be low for a VERY long time Second, this alone should be enough to keep long rates down, thus making it ok for them to slow down and eventually exit LSAPs. Which says to me, rates will be low for ever, and we need to get the hell out of LSAPs.
  • The title alone, "Communication and Monetary Policy", gives you a clue as to the case Bernanke is trying to make. He is wanting the markets to put equal if not more importance on what the Fed "communicates" to the markets, and NOT the money” he’s inserting into markets via "monetary policy" or LSAPs (Large Scale Asset Purchases). In my opinion, you can almost sense that Bernanke is somewhat frustrated with how the markets have attached more importance to LSAP as opposed to his "forward guidance". More on this as we go.
  • Page 1, "enhanced transparency is increasing the effectiveness of monetary policy." Transparency equals communication. Essentially, Bernanke is going to try and make a case that the Fed's communication of forward rate guidance "should" be more powerful than any LSAPs they do. He admits the future "can be only imperfectly foreseen" (no kidding), yet forward guidance is an essential element of monetary policy.
  • Page 2, "expectations matter so much that a central bank may be able to help make policy more effective by working to shape those expectations". This argument seems completely ridiculous to me. Not only are the markets to manage their own day to day affairs AND make preparations for future demands, but they must also manage what the Fed is doing right now AND what they "think" the Fed is going to do in the future. So not only will Fed actions affect the future by their current actions, but they want you to react to what they have planned for the future. Seriously! Just get the hell out of the way and the markets to their job!
  • Page 3, "it is beyond the power of the central bank to set a longer-run target for employment that is immutable or independent of the underlying structure of the economy". Again, no kidding!
  • Page 4, ok! this one was VERY important!   "Currently, FOMC participants' estimates of the longer-run normal unemployment rate, as publicly reported in the quarterly Summary of Economic Projections, range from 5.2 to 6 percent." This is very important because later Bernanke will go on to explain that when he referred to 6.5% unemployment as a time they would consider policy changes, he was not defining a "trigger", but simply a "threshold". A time to start “considering” policy changes, NOT a time to start. Thus I think this mention of 5.2 to 6% shows that the FOMC wants unemployment well below 6.5% before they start to pull back on monetary policies. Thus an adjustment to forward guidance. You'll see that this essentially EXTENDS the life of zero bound rate policy well into the future!
  • Page 5, "this increased transparency about the framework of policy has aided the public in forming policy expectations, reduced uncertainty, and made policy more effective." I don't think so. I think they've done nothing but inflate asset bubbles and caused markets to put future planning on hold, because they have no clue what the Fed will do next. Bernanke goes on to explain that because of this unforeseen crisis, they had to come up with NEW policy tools. Ok, so you want markets to react to your policies, yet you didn't see the last crash, AND you are now using NEW techniques. How the hell is a market supposed to operate under “new” policies to come let along current policies in place? It obviously cannot!
  • Page 6, "The recoveries from most post-World War II U.S. recessions had been relatively rapid, with production, unemployment, and other key variables returning to close to normal levels within six to eight quarters." NOT THIS TIME!
  • Page 7, "After the FOMC stated in December 2008 that it would likely be appropriate for the federal funds rate to remain near zero for "some time," it changed the formulation in March 2009 to "an extended period." However, such language did not convey very precisely the Committee's intentions." Well why not just say "we are going to keep rates low for a super duper unbelievably crazy long freaking time"? The message throughout his speech is an almost begging of the markets to understand that they will keep the fed funds rates lower for a VERY VERY VERY long time, going on to say that even when it looks like the economy is well on the mend, rates will still remain low long after.
  • Page 8, moving from how long they were going to keep rates low, they decided to move to "so-called state-contingent guidance", and apparently this provided greater clarity. We'll see later in the speech it in fact did not.
  • Page 9, this is where Bernanke explains that the unemployment rate is a "threshold" and not a "trigger". He also offers a few reasons why the "quality" of unemployment will matter also, like payroll employment, rates of hiring and separation and the big one, LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION. If you've paid attention to my emails on this last topic you'll know that the participation rate is at a 35 year low, and falling fast! Thus the "quality" sucks!
  • Page 10, Bernanke starts to talk about LSAP, and comparing that to forward guidance, to keep long term rates low. This is the beginning of his argument that the markets should put more weight on forward guidance versus LSAPs. 
  • Page 11 is a MUST READ! He admits that they have much less experience with LSAP. LSAPs “have other drawbacks that include the risk of impairing the functioning of securities markets”. At least he is admitting they really have no idea what the ramifications are going to be, but there will be some.
  • Page 12, "In deciding to employ LSAPs, the FOMC has accordingly remained attentive to the possible costs and risks as well as to the efficacy of this less familiar tool," 
  • Page 13, "the Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens." Once again, they are telling us rates will be kept low for a very very long time!
  • Page 14, "greater uncertainty about the costs and efficacy of LSAPs." "Moreover, to the extent that the use of LSAPs engenders additional costs and risks, one might expect the tradeoff between the efficacy and costs of this tool to become less favorable as the Federal Reserve's balance sheet expands." Bernanke starts to talk about his "intention" of "possible" tapering near the end of 2013. He even points to the fact that he said if data remained consistent the Committee would LIKELY begin measured reductions in LSAPs, yet he also said they could increase the purchase if data went bad.
  • Page 15, "Financial market movements are often difficult to account for," Really! Did you really just say that out loud? This is where the astonishing HUBRIS of Ben Bernanke begins to shine through! He goes on to explain three reasons why rates "actually" went up, OTHER than the obvious reason that the largest buyer was talking about buying less. 1, the economy was improving and thus some increase was warranted. BS! 2, some institutions started to unwind levered positions, and in reality this was a good thing. That would be good thing if they delevered, problem is they levered right back up when he didn’t go through with the taper. And finally 3, it appears that the Feds forward rate guidance became less effective "after June" and the markets assumed tapering meant pulling forward the zero bound. Again, BS! The VERY moment they started LSAPs, they became more important to long term rates than forward guidance. 85 billion a month WILL have an effect on prices.
  • Page 16, Ok! Check this out, this was the best part of the whole speech, "To the extent that this third factor - a perceived reduction in the Fed's commitment to meeting its objectives - contributed to the increase in yields, IT WAS NEITHER WELCOME NOR WARRANTED, in the judgment of the FOMC." ARE YOU KIDDING ME! So not only were you surprised by the markets reaction, you were offended by it as well. AND, the market's reaction was "WRONG"? Can "HUBRIS" be demonstrated any better?
  • Page 16 continued, he then goes on to explain that they decided not to taper because job market metrics looked "mixed" and they were worried about the fiscal debates. BS! BS! BS! They didn't taper because rates were ramping up, and markets ALL OVER WORLD were rapidly deteriorating! THAT"S THE ONLY REASON!
  • Page 16 again, it gets even better here "Although the FOMC's decision came as a surprise to some market participants, it appears to have strengthened the credibility of the Committee's forward rate guidance, in particular, following the decision, longer-term rates fell and expectations of short-term rates revived from financial market prices showed, and continue to show, a pattern more consistent with the guidance." WOW! Just when I didn't think his level hubris could climb any higher, he straps on a jet-pack and takes off. No, rates came down a bit and stabilized for now because no one in the market has a clue if and when you are going to get the hell out of the markets. You even said if things don't look as good as you want, you may raise LSAP purchases. How is anyone supposed to behave in this market. GOOD GRIEF MAN!!!!
  • Page 17 and 18, rates will remain low long after LSAPs have ended, and "perhaps" well after the unemployment "threshold" is crossed.
  • So there you have it! My conclusion, they are worried about the efficacy and risks of LSAPs and they want to get the hell out. Yet they DO NOT want the markets to react to this. They want you to understand what they mean by keeping rates low for an "extended period of time". It means a VERY VERY VERY long time.THUS, you Mr. Market need to keep buying long term bonds and do not let the rates go up.
  • With all this said, Bernanke did not mention inflation very much. That’s because THERE IS NONE, at least not in the traditional sense. The Fed does make it clear that if inflation gets out of control, and this means "well" above 2%, not just at or slightly above it, they will stop it. But again as you may have seen in previous emails, M2 velocity, which means how effective increased money supply by fed or market is at creating GDP, is at the lowest EVER MEASURED and falling fast. This means the Feds printing has been completely ineffective at creating GDP. And thus ineffective at creating inflation. At least not in production. There of course has been inflation in asset bubbles ALL OVER THE WORLD, including US stock and bond markets.

 

I hope you read and contemplate this speech. The Fed will keep the Fed Funds rate at zero for the rest our careers. The possibility of a negative rate, which means being charged for deposits, is even being mentioned now. Something has to give. Someone needs to end the Fed's control of the world. It will not be pretty, but we must let the markets adjust on their own, or they will NEVER truly heal.

 

Randy Woodward

 



Prepared for informational purposes only.  Not an official confirmation of terms.  Based on information generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable.  Changes to assumptions may materially impact returns.  Past performances is not indicative of future results.  Price/availability is subject to change without notice.  This is neither an offer to sell nor a solicitation of an offer to buy a new issue.  For further information on a new issue, including a prospectus, please contact your Raymond James salesperson.  Raymond James & Associates, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Raymond James Financial, Inc.



Wednesday, November 27, 2013

A couple things to contemplate as we near the end of Ben Bernanke's Fed Chairmanship, January 31, 2014.

·         Below is the scheduled FOMC meetings/announcement dates.

·         As you can see, Bernanke will Chair two more meetings. December and January, with his Chairmanship ending January 31st, 2014.

·         I’ve asked myself, “could”  this have any significance?

·         Well, I think it just might. Now this is strictly a “theory”, and one that is probably quite convoluted, but I think it’s an interesting contemplation.

·         From Bernanke’s last speech November 19th (which I’m going to report on in details later) it was made VERY clear that he/they? desperately want to pull back on LSAPs (Large Scale Asset Purchases, i.e. “QE”) to “some” degree in the near future. I’ll explain this in more detail later, but it’s an obvious Fed desire. Yet he was admittedly dismayed at the market’s reaction and subsequent climbing interest rates on the long end of the curve (and probably the selloff in the stock market as well). And he talked at length in this speech how the market was simply wrong to react this way.

·         The end result of course was they did not taper. Yet, we know they want to.

·         With all that said, here is my theory. I believe Bernanke would like to taper on his watch. And I think most of the FOMC members would like to see this get started as well. However, it’s obvious they were surprised by how the markets reacted, and they would rather not cause any damage, if possible. But they and we all know it may very well do that. But we will not know for sure until they do. Thus I think they want and “need” to start a taper for real this time, and see what the actual results turn out to be. And I’m sure they will hope that any short term reaction will dissipate with time and all will be well. (again, more on this when I report on Bernanke’s latest speech). However, and this is the key to my theory, if there is a sustained negative reaction to the taper, of which they lose control, what better time to have the Fed change its mind and undo the taper, if not increase LSAPs, than under a NEW CHAIRMAN! There is no way a Fed Chairman would want to start a taper, and then have to change his mind months later. He would look ridiculous and make it obvious they have no control. But if a new chairman was to do it, I believe it would look less ridiculous or less “out of control”. Yellen could come in and simply say that she has a different opinion, refer to a bunch of “metrics” she feels are going the wrong direction, and reverse the taper.

·         I know this probably  fantastical, but so is a Fed balance sheet at $4 Trillion dollars and growing $1 trillion a year at the current pace.

·         Now, I don’t see this happening at the next December meeting in the heart of Christmas shopping season. But I can see it happening at the last meeting late January. And he would have all of January to “suggest” again that he wants to taper, “talk” a negative reaction down all January, and then actually do it at his last meeting.

·         What I do know for certain, is these LSAPs cannot continue forever. It simply has to go away sooner or later.

 

 

Randy Woodward

 



Prepared for informational purposes only.  Not an official confirmation of terms.  Based on information generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable.  Changes to assumptions may materially impact returns.  Past performances is not indicative of future results.  Price/availability is subject to change without notice.  This is neither an offer to sell nor a solicitation of an offer to buy a new issue.  For further information on a new issue, including a prospectus, please contact your Raymond James salesperson.  Raymond James & Associates, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Raymond James Financial, Inc.



A couple things to contemplate as we near the end of Ben Bernanke's Fed Chairmanship, January 31, 2014.

·         Below is the scheduled FOMC meetings/announcement dates.

·         As you can see, Bernanke will Chair two more meetings. December and January, with his Chairmanship ending January 31st, 2014.

·         I’ve asked myself, “could”  this have any significance?

·         Well, I think it just might. Now this is strictly a “theory”, and one that is probably quite convoluted, but I think it’s an interesting contemplation.

·         From Bernanke’s last speech November 19th (which I’m going to report on in details later) it was made VERY clear that he/they? desperately want to pull back on LSAPs (Large Scale Asset Purchases, i.e. “QE”) to “some” degree in the near future. I’ll explain this in more detail later, but it’s an obvious Fed desire. Yet he was admittedly dismayed at the market’s reaction and subsequent climbing interest rates on the long end of the curve (and probably the selloff in the stock market as well). And he talked at length in this speech how the market was simply wrong to react this way.

·         The end result of course was they did not taper. Yet, we know they want to.

·         With all that said, here is my theory. I believe Bernanke would like to taper on his watch. And I think most of the FOMC members would like to see this get started as well. However, it’s obvious they were surprised by how the markets reacted, and they would rather not cause any damage, if possible. But they and we all know it may very well do that. But we will not know for sure until they do. Thus I think they want and “need” to start a taper for real this time, and see what the actual results turn out to be. And I’m sure they will hope that any short term reaction will dissipate with time and all will be well. (again, more on this when I report on Bernanke’s latest speech). However, and this is the key to my theory, if there is a sustained negative reaction to the taper, of which they lose control, what better time to have the Fed change its mind and undo the taper, if not increase LSAPs, than under a NEW CHAIRMAN! There is no way a Fed Chairman would want to start a taper, and then have to change his mind months later. He would look ridiculous and make it obvious they have no control. But if a new chairman was to do it, I believe it would look less ridiculous or less “out of control”. Yellen could come in and simply say that she has a different opinion, refer to a bunch of “metrics” she feels are going the wrong direction, and reverse the taper.

·         I know this probably  fantastical, but so is a Fed balance sheet at $4 Trillion dollars and growing $1 trillion a year at the current pace.

·         Now, I don’t see this happening at the next December meeting in the heart of Christmas shopping season. But I can see it happening at the last meeting late January. And he would have all of January to “suggest” again that he wants to taper, “talk” a negative reaction down all January, and then actually do it at his last meeting.

·         What I do know for certain, is these LSAPs cannot continue forever. It simply has to go away sooner or later.

 

 

Randy Woodward

 



Prepared for informational purposes only.  Not an official confirmation of terms.  Based on information generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable.  Changes to assumptions may materially impact returns.  Past performances is not indicative of future results.  Price/availability is subject to change without notice.  This is neither an offer to sell nor a solicitation of an offer to buy a new issue.  For further information on a new issue, including a prospectus, please contact your Raymond James salesperson.  Raymond James & Associates, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Raymond James Financial, Inc.



Friday, November 22, 2013

Just for fun, here is how the Fed defines its goals, and my thoughts in red. Randy

http://www.frbsf.org/us-monetary-policy-introduction/goals/

What are the goals of U.S. monetary policy?

Monetary policy has two basic goals: to promote “maximum” sustainable output and employment and to promote “stable” prices. These goals are prescribed in a 1977 amendment to the Federal Reserve Act.

What do maximum sustainable output and employment mean?

In the long run, the amount of goods and services the economy produces (output) and the number of jobs it generates (employment) both depend on factors other than monetary policy. These factors include technology and people’s preferences for saving, risk, and work effort. So, maximum sustainable output and employment mean the levels consistent with these factors in the long run. So why is it necessary to try and “manage” all the other social factors?

But the economy goes through business cycles in which output and employment are above or below their long-run levels. Even though monetary policy can’t affect either output or employment in the long run, it can affect them in the short run. The fed has been intervening aggressively since 2007, and continues to do so 5 year into this crisis, so how exactly does the Fed define “short run”? For example, when demand weakens and there’s a recession, the Fed can stimulate the economy—temporarily—and help push it back toward its long-run level of output by lowering interest rates. That’s why stabilizing the economy—that is, smoothing out the peaks and valleys in output and employment around their long-run growth paths—is a key short-run objective for the Fed and many other central banks. “Smoothing” takes away the opportunities for businesses and consumers to “discover” appropriate “market” defined prices. The very point of business cycles are so adjustments to supply and demand can be made, and this takes time. “Smoothing” the discovery process only causes the adjustments to be postponed, and more severe adjustments to be make in the future.  

If the Fed can stimulate the economy out of a recession, why doesn’t it stimulate the economy all the time?

Persistent attempts to expand the economy beyond its long-run growth path will press capacity constraints and lead to higher and higher inflation, without producing lower unemployment or higher output in the long run. In other words, not only are there no long-term gains from persistently pursuing expansionary policies, but there’s also a price—higher inflation. And when the Fed uses floods money into an economy that doesn’t need or want the extra funds, they simply inflate asset bubbles.

What’s so bad about higher inflation?

High inflation is bad because it can hinder economic growth, and for a lot of reasons. For one thing, it makes it harder to tell what a change in the price of a particular product means. For example, a firm that is offered higher prices for its products can have trouble telling how much of the price change is due to stronger demand for its products and how much reflects the economy-wide rise in prices. “Managed” inflation through monetary policy fits this description. “Market” generated inflation does not. Market inflation results in either customers looking for other products, or new suppliers coming in to create appropriate supply to bring the inflation down.

Moreover, when inflation is high, it also tends to vary a lot, and that makes people uncertain about what inflation will be in the future. That uncertainty can hinder economic growth in a couple of ways—it adds an inflation risk premium to long-term interest rates, and it complicates further the planning and contracting by businesses and households that are so essential to capital formation. In other words, people will be more careful about how they spend their money and what contracts they enter in to. And the Fed sees this as a bad thing. I see it as a necessary correction or modification to an economy.

That’s not all. Because many aspects of the tax system are not indexed to inflation, high inflation distorts economic decisions by arbitrarily increasing or decreasing after-tax rates of return to different kinds of economic activities. In addition, it leads people to spend time and resources hedging against inflation instead of pursuing more productive activities. Frugality takes no time at all.

Another problem is that a surprise inflation tends to redistribute wealth. For example, when loans have fixed rates, a surprise inflation redistributes wealth from lenders to borrowers, because inflation lowers the real burden of making a stream of payments whose nominal value is fixed. I don’t think the borrowers would mind.

So should the Fed try to get the inflation rate to zero?

Actually, there’s a lot of debate about that. While some economists have suggested zero inflation as a target, others argue that an inflation rate that’s too low can be a problem. For example, if inflation is very low or close to zero, then short-term interest rates also are likely to be very close to zero. In that case, the Fed might not have enough room to lower short-term interest rates if it needed to stimulate the economy. Of course, the Fed could conduct policy using more unconventional methods (such as trying to reduce long-term interest rates), but it’s not clear that those methods would be as easy to use or as effective. Another problem is that, when inflation is very close to zero, there’s a bigger risk of deflation. Well, they nailed this one. Zero short term rates and managed long term rate have indeed not done a damn thing to stimulate the economy. Thus why they are now buying 85 billion a month in bonds. Which is not working either. Why does there even need to be a “target”, and who’s says their target is “right”. The “market” will decide what inflation should be.

What’s so bad about deflation?

First, let’s talk about the difference between disinflation and deflation. Disinflation just means that the rate of inflation is slowing—say, from 3% a year to 2% a year. Deflation, in contrast, means that there’s a fall in prices; and it’s not just a fall in prices in some sectors—like the familiar falling prices of a lot of computer equipment. Rather, in a deflation, prices are falling throughout the economy, so the inflation rate is negative. That may sound good, if you’re a consumer.

But, in fact, deflation can be as bad as too much inflation. And the reasons are pretty similar. For example, to go back to the case of the fixed-rate loan, a surprise deflation also redistributes wealth, but in the opposite direction from inflation, that is, from borrowers to lenders. The reason is that deflation raises the real burden of making a stream of payments whose nominal value is fixed.

A substantial, prolonged deflation, like the one during the Great Depression, can be associated with severe problems in the financial system. It can lead to significant declines in the value of collateral owned by households and firms, making it more difficult to borrow. And falling collateral values may force lenders to call in outstanding loans, which would force firms to cut back their scale of operations and force households to cut back consumption. The Fed can keep us from deflation by printing more money as they are. But this does NOT solve all the issues that caused the deflation to begin with, which is always over-indebtedness and the eventual distress sales of assets when the debt has become too much to manage. They can maintain prices, but all the problems that caused prices to move are still there.

Finally, in a deflationary episode, interest rates are likely to be lower than they are during periods of low inflation, which means that the Fed’s ability to stimulate the economy will be even more limited. Yep! We see that now!

So that’s why the other goal is “stable prices”?

Yes. Price “stability” is basically a low-inflation environment where people and firms can make financial decisions without worrying about where prices are headed. Moreover, this is all the Fed can achieve in the long run. We should always worry about where prices are headed. That’s the very point of managing our finances. With prices artificially predictable, some end up living check to check. They can have everything they want right NOW! And it will all work out. Yet, when prices are left to the market, we see that things can change. We realize that we need to save money for unforeseen price increases. Or possibly even for price decreases. The point is market volatility teaches us that we need to hope for the best, but always prepare for the worse. It teaches us to be responsible. The problem now is that “when”, and it will happen, the Fed fails to “manage” everything exactly the way they want, the people will not be equipped to handle the volatility of what’s to come.

If low inflation is the only thing the Fed can achieve in the long run, why isn’t it the sole focus of monetary policy?

Because the Fed can determine the economy’s average rate of inflation, some commentators—and some members of Congress as well—have emphasized the need to define the goals of monetary policy in terms of price stability, which is achievable.

But the Fed, of course, also can affect output and employment in the short run. And big swings in output and employment are costly to people, too. So, in practice, the Fed, like most central banks, cares about both inflation and measures of the short-run performance of the economy. We already know now that “short term” has lost its meaning. There will ALWAYS be unemployment. That’s a natural part of industry cycles. In our current case, unemployment is high because it was probably too low for a long time, which debt fueled demand since the 80’s. That has come to an end. They can play with the calculations all they want, but true unemployment is probably over 11%, and will be for a long time until the markets are allowed to enter their own equilibrium. Which is the ebb and flow of market economies.

Are the two goals ever in conflict?

Yes, sometimes they are. One kind of conflict involves deciding which goal should take precedence at any point in time. For example, suppose there’s a recession and the Fed works to prevent employment losses from being too severe; this short-run success could turn into a long-run problem if monetary policy remains expansionary too long, because that could trigger inflationary pressures. So it’s important for the Fed to find the balance between its short-run goal of stabilization and its longer-run goal of maintaining low inflation. Once again, short-run silly. Inflation can be measured in many ways. Right now, there is inflation in the financial markets. That is because all the money the Fed is printing is NOT going into productive assets, it’s only going into speculative assets. The fact is, as long as the private sector continues to deleverage, the Fed can only print to try and keep up with that delevering. But in the end, the Fed will not be able to keep up, and we will have deflation. That is proved by the lowest velocity in M2 money flow ever recorded.

Another kind of conflict involves the potential for pressure from the political arena. For example, in the day-to-day course of governing the country and making economic policy, politicians may be tempted to put the emphasis on short-run results rather than on the longer-run health of the economy. The Fed is somewhat insulated from such pressure, however, by its independence, which allows it to strive for a more appropriate balance between short-run and long-run objectives. BS!

Why don’t the goals include helping a region of the country that’s in recession?

Often, some state or region is going through a recession of its own while the national economy is humming along. But the Fed can’t concentrate its efforts on expanding the weak region for two reasons. First, monetary policy works through credit markets, and since credit markets are linked nationally, the Fed simply has no way to direct stimulus only to a particular part of the country that needs help. Second, if the Fed stimulated whenever any state had economic hard times, it would be stimulating much of the time, and this would result in excessive stimulation for the overall country and higher inflation.

But this focus on the well-being of the national economy doesn’t mean that the Fed ignores regional economic conditions. It relies on extensive regional data and anecdotal information, along with statistics that directly measure developments in regional economies, to fit together a picture of the national economy’s performance. This is one advantage to having regional Federal Reserve Bank Presidents sit on the FOMC: They’re in close contact with economic developments in their regions of the country.

Why don’t the goals include trying to prevent stock market “bubbles” like the one at the end of the 1990s?

In theory, stock prices should reflect the value of firms’ “fundamentals,” such as their expected future earnings. So it’s hard to come up with logical explanations for why they would get out of line, that is, why a bubble would form. After all, U.S. stock markets are among the most efficient in the world—there’s a lot of information available and the trading mechanisms function very smoothly. And stock market analysts and others devote huge amounts of resources to figuring out what the appropriate price of a stock is at any point in time.

Even so, it’s hard to deny the evidence of mispricing from episodes like the rise and fall of the Nasdaq over the last decade or so: it went from a monthly average of a little more than 750 in January 1995 to a peak of just over 4,800 in March 2000, before falling back to roughly 1,350 in March 2003. Unfortunately, evidence of a bubble is easy to find after it has burst, but it’s much harder to find as the bubble is forming. The reason is that policymakers—and other observers—can find it hard to tell whether stock prices are moving up because fundamentals are changing or because prices are out of line with fundamentals.

Even if the Fed suspected that a bubble had developed, it’s not clear how monetary policy should respond. Raising the funds rate by a quarter, a half, or even a full percentage point probably wouldn’t make people slow down their investments in the stock market when individual stock prices are doubling or tripling and even broad stock market indexes are going up by 20% or 30% a year. It’s likely that raising the funds rate enough to burst the bubble would do significant harm to the economy. For instance, some have argued that the Fed may have worsened the Great Depression by trying to deflate the stock market bubble of the late 1920s. Bernanke has made it more than clear that the stock market is the number one way to communicate to main street that everything is ok. And he said he would, and has, inflated the stock market to try and get everyone to ignore all the people they know losing their jobs, and continue to buy widgets.

Should the Fed ignore the stock market then?

Not at all. Stock markets provide information about the future course of the economy that the Fed may find useful in conducting policy. For instance, a sustained increase in the stock market is likely to make households feel wealthier, which tends to make them increase their consumption. And if the economy were already at full capacity, this would cause inflationary pressures. So a sustained increase in the stock market could lead the Fed to modify its inflation and output forecasts and adjust its policy response accordingly. Ok, I jumped the gun on this explanation. Funny how they describe the efficiencies of the “market” above, but then explain that they’ll “manage” it up if they feel the “market” is wrong. I can’t believe they can get away with this.

Beyond concerns about the economy, the Fed also pays attention to the stock market because of its concerns about financial market stability. A good example of this is what happened after the stock market crash of 1987. At that time, the Fed cut interest rates and stated that it was ready to supply the liquidity needs of the market because it wanted to ensure that markets would continue to function. Which is probably why we ended up have two stock bubbles blow, and a third in the process.

 

Randy Woodward
Managing Director, Fixed Income Capital Markets

One Burton Hills Blvd, Ste 225, Nashville, TN 37205

( Toll-Free 800.764.7621

6 Mobile 615.969.2682

Randy.Woodward@RaymondJames.com

 



Prepared for informational purposes only.  Not an official confirmation of terms.  Based on information generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable.  Changes to assumptions may materially impact returns.  Past performances is not indicative of future results.  Price/availability is subject to change without notice.  This is neither an offer to sell nor a solicitation of an offer to buy a new issue.  For further information on a new issue, including a prospectus, please contact your Raymond James salesperson.  Raymond James & Associates, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Raymond James Financial, Inc.



Thursday, November 21, 2013

The media keeps describing Fed actions as "Keynesian", yet I'm not sure that's accurate.

From everything I’ve read, Keynes first off believed most in Government “direct” intervention on unemployment, suggested implementation of any public work project to put people to work even if the project in the end did not generate income. Keynes appeared to promote “reflation” or price controls as a secondary option and only for a temporary period of time. As you still see below, Fisher described the reason for this quite well, but also supplied a warning. In this book, Fisher also describes in great detail what causes depressions and the cycle from beginning to end. But given that we are in the cycle already, and it has been “stalled” by the Fed, I felt it was more interesting to see what Fisher had to say what would come “after” the reflation.

 

I’ve just read Irving Fisher’s “"The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions", and I’ve come away with something rather interesting. Fisher believed, of which I agree, that depressions are caused by both over-indebtedness followed by distressed selling or selling at distressed prices. This all leads to a depression as the system cascades upon itself. What I found interesting was revealed in in what he called his “creed”, which consisted of 49 articles. In the 38th article he says this, “On the other hand, if the foregoing analysis is correct, it is always economically possible to stop or prevent such a depression simply by reflating the price level up to the average level at which outstanding debts were contracted by existing debtors and assumed by existing creditors, and then maintain that level unchanged.” In other words, Fisher believe to avoid a depression, price levels should be “controlled”. Well, that’s precisely what The Fed has done. That have effectively stopped the over-indebtedness/distress selling cycle in its tracks. How marvelous. With that said, Fisher’s 42nd and 43rd articles of his creed went on to say this. 42nd “If the debt-deflation theory of great depressions is essentially correct, the question of controlling the price3 level assumes a new importance; and those in the drivers’ seats – the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury, or, let us hope, a special stabilization commission – will in the future be held to a new accountability.” No doubt they “should” be held to a new accountability, and very interesting about the “hope” of a commission – which of course was Simpson/Bowles and yet no one listened, oh well. Now here is where it gets most interesting. 43rd “Price level control, or dollar control, would not be a panacea.  Even with an ideally stable dollar, we would still be exposed to the debt disease, to the technological-unemployment disease, to over-production, price-dislocation, over-confidence, and many other minor diseases. To find the proper therapy for these diseases will keep economists busy long after we have exterminated the dollar disease.”

 

So, in essence, Fisher believed that the Fed/Treasury should step in and control prices, to prevent deflation and thus a depression. But he knew the actual “diseases” that caused the problem would not be fixed by this measure. In this particular book he does not go on to say whether he thought the “diseases” curable by intervention, but I’ll be reading a book he wrote two years later that may answer that question, “100% Money and the Public Debt”.

 

Randy Woodward
Managing Director, Fixed Income Capital Markets

One Burton Hills Blvd, Ste 225, Nashville, TN 37205

( Toll-Free 800.764.7621

6 Mobile 615.969.2682

Randy.Woodward@RaymondJames.com

 



Prepared for informational purposes only.  Not an official confirmation of terms.  Based on information generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable.  Changes to assumptions may materially impact returns.  Past performances is not indicative of future results.  Price/availability is subject to change without notice.  This is neither an offer to sell nor a solicitation of an offer to buy a new issue.  For further information on a new issue, including a prospectus, please contact your Raymond James salesperson.  Raymond James & Associates, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Raymond James Financial, Inc.



Wednesday, November 20, 2013

A few thoughts on this afternoon's market move on the 10yr to 2.79%

·         The release of last month’s FOMC minutes “suggest” a desire to start tapering sometime in the next few meetings.

·         This has caused the 10yr to trade from about 2.70% to 2.795%.

·         Let’s keep in mind that these FOMC minutes are from a month ago. A few things have happened since.

·          Unemployment ticked up from 7.2% to 7.3%. The wrong direction.

·         The labor force participation rate TANKED from 63.2% to 62.8%, now the lowest since 1978. Please keep in mind Bernanke and Yellen have often mentioned that the 6.5% target for unemployment is NOT a “trigger”, it’s a general level, and this level will also be measured on its “quality”. A tanking participation rate does not bode well for quality.

·         It’s becoming more clear every day that Obamacare is going to increase the costs of carrying health care insurance, a TAX, more than most people thought. Not a political statement at all. Just a truth and it must be viewed as a tax.

·         ALSO, during this past month, not only has the ECB put in a surprise rate cut in, it is now talking outwardly about the possibility of a negative funds rate to apparently “force” lending. Which is ridiculous, we all know this will just again increase the bubbles in stocks and bonds. But “if” Europe has turned a corner as the media constantly pontificates, why would they be taking these steps? Could it be that Europe has NOT turned any corner, and more likely is making a turn for the worse. I believe so.

·         So, with all that said. I do not believe the Fed will be tapering in the next few months.

·         And to put myself out on a limb, I believe there is a 50/50 chance that the next Fed move will be to actually increase its asset purchases.

·         Now, there is the potential for two caveats to this theory. First, and this is a stretch, “if” the Fed wanted to “test” a taper to truly see what the immediate and longer lasting effects would be, this could be a good time to try. They could try it under Bernanke, and undo the taper under Yellen if it’s more severe than they thought. I could not seeing a reverse being done under one chairman, but doing it with a new chairman I could see. The second caveat were comments in the FOMC meetings about “other” things they could do. They don’t way what these are, they just say they could try “other things”. Now that could those things be? You may recall my crazy prediction of the past several years! I’ve predicted the Fed could come in a “directly” fund 50yr amortizing 2% home loans to ANYONE who wanted it. Think for a moment how incredibly stimulating that would be. Not only lower interest costs to all homeowners, but also lowering the monthly amortizing principal payment. That would IMMEDIATELY give consumers money to SPEND! I know it sounds nuts, but in my opinion this is very precisely what was done during the 30’s, ultimately resulting in the creating of Fannie Mae in 1937.

·         Also, If you care to, attached is a speech Yellen gave in  June 2012, where near the end she makes it VERY clear that if more monetary easing was needed, she would have no problem increasing the asset purchases.

·         For my last thought, I will leave you with this. Both in the FOMC minutes and in a speech Bernanke gave last night, attached, the Fed is now trying to communicate that rates will not be raised for even longer than they have been saying. In the FOMC minutes they say this will be an effective tool. And last night Bernanke explained that even if the inflation targets are meet, and even if 6.5% unemployment (and I’m assuming quality as well) are met, rates WILL not be raised for a significant time after.

·         So as I’ve been saying for the past 5yrs, the Fed will not be raising rates for a very long time. I might say 5 to 10yrs, for no other reason than 15 to 20yrs makes me sounds nuts. But that’s what I believe.

 

Randy Woodward
Managing Director, Fixed Income Capital Markets

One Burton Hills Blvd, Ste 225, Nashville, TN 37205

( Toll-Free 800.764.7621

6 Mobile 615.969.2682

Randy.Woodward@RaymondJames.com

 



Prepared for informational purposes only.  Not an official confirmation of terms.  Based on information generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable.  Changes to assumptions may materially impact returns.  Past performances is not indicative of future results.  Price/availability is subject to change without notice.  This is neither an offer to sell nor a solicitation of an offer to buy a new issue.  For further information on a new issue, including a prospectus, please contact your Raymond James salesperson.  Raymond James & Associates, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Raymond James Financial, Inc.



If CPI is any indication of the Feds desire of 2% inflation, we are a long way off it seems.

US CPI year over year just came in a 1%, other than 2009, that’s the lowest level since February 1965!

And this is with a $4 trillion Fed balance sheet.

THAT, my friends, is private sector deleveraging! And we have a long way to go!

 

 

Randy Woodward

 



Prepared for informational purposes only.  Not an official confirmation of terms.  Based on information generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable.  Changes to assumptions may materially impact returns.  Past performances is not indicative of future results.  Price/availability is subject to change without notice.  This is neither an offer to sell nor a solicitation of an offer to buy a new issue.  For further information on a new issue, including a prospectus, please contact your Raymond James salesperson.  Raymond James & Associates, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Raymond James Financial, Inc.



Well this is pretty darn interesting, both as it relates to currency wars but also what "may" be talked about in the U.S.

ECB Said to Consider Mini Deposit-Rate Cut If More Easing Needed
2013-11-20 15:20:00.0 GMT


By Jana Randow and Jeff Black
Nov. 20 (Bloomberg) -- The European Central Bank is considering a smaller-than-normal cut in the deposit rate if officials decide to take it negative for the first time, according to two people with knowledge of the debate.
Policy makers would reduce the rate for commercial lenders who park excess cash at the ECB to minus 0.1 percent from zero, said the people who declined to be identified because the talks aren't public. It would be the first time the central bank has adjusted interest rates by less than a quarter of a percentage point. The concept, which has been discussed by Governing Council members, doesn't yet have a consensus, the people said.
Members of the council, which is holding a mid-month meeting in Frankfurt this week, have said that a negative deposit rate is a potential tool for warding off deflation.
They've also cautioned that the consequences of such an unprecedented measure aren't clear. The central bank this month refrained from cutting the deposit rate even as it reduced its benchmark lending rate to a record low of 0.25 percent, and Governing Council member Jens Weidmann has warned against further loosening of monetary policy.
An ECB spokesman declined to comment on the council's deliberations.
ECB President Mario Draghi said on Nov. 7 that the central bank is "technically ready" for a negative deposit rate if the economic outlook warrants it. Executive Board member Peter Praet said in Hong Kong a week later that a rate below zero is possible.

Spurring Lending

Policy makers hope that the measure, obliging banks to pay to hold a liquidity cushion, would prompt them to lend cash to companies and households instead, the people said. At the same time, a negative deposit rate also risks curbing banks' profit as loan rates fall while the institutions may be unable to pass negative rates onto depositors.
By cutting by less than a quarter-point, the central bank could test the policy while minimizing disruption to the financial system, one of the people said. The ECB's next interest-rate decision will be announced on Dec. 5. Denmark currently has a deposit rate of minus 0.1 percent.
Any moves to ease monetary policy further will probably face resistance from Germany, the euro area's biggest economy.
Bundesbank President Weidmann said in an interview with Die Zeit to be published tomorrow that it is not "sensible" to consider further monetary loosening. That would distract from the roots of the financial crisis, he said.
Inflation in the 17-nation currency bloc slowed to 0.7 percent in October, the slowest pace in four years and less than half the ECB's target of just under 2 percent. Economic growth was 0.1 percent last quarter, down from the 0.3 percent in the three months through June that marked the end of a record-long recession. The jobless rate is at a record 12.2 percent

For Related News and Information:
Draghi Rate Cut Puts ECB in Holding Pattern Until 2014 NSN MWGMTV6JIJVU <GO> Draghi Said to Have Pushed for Rate Cut in Tussle on Rate Timing NSN MVWVMR0YHQ0X <GO> Euro Zone's Fizzling Growth Seen to Back Draghi Cut NSN MW3WBZ6K50XS <GO> Search for central bank stories: NSE MONETARY POLICY <GO> Stories on ECB interest rates: STNI ECBACTION <GO> Euro-region economic stories: TNI ECO EUROP <GO>

--Editors: Paul Gordon, Craig Stirling

Randy Woodward








________________________________

Prepared for informational purposes only. Not an official confirmation of terms. Based on information generally available to the public from sources believed to be reliable. Changes to assumptions may materially impact returns. Past performances is not indicative of future results. Price/availability is subject to change without notice. This is neither an offer to sell nor a solicitation of an offer to buy a new issue. For further information on a new issue, including a prospectus, please contact your Raymond James salesperson. Raymond James & Associates, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Raymond James Financial, Inc.

Monday, November 18, 2013

As the Keynesian hordes amass at the gates, arm yourself with some logic to ward them off with Hayek’s Noble Prize lecture. Important read!

As you may have noticed, the term "Keynesian" has been referred to ad nauseam lately due to the extraordinary efforts of the Fed to "manage" the economy back to health. The primary opponent to Keynesian economics is Austrian Economics. Essentially, government intervention versus laissez-faire. This debate has been going on since The Great Depression, and it will most likely go on forever. But I recently stumbled upon this short lecture by Friedrich Hayek at his Nobel Prize acceptance. Hayek grew up during the Weimar Republic and directly experienced things most people have not, and hopefully will not, and it gave him a unique perspective on governments and economies. And although both sides can be argued, I found this "philosophical" view of the debate to be extremely persuasive. As you read this, I'd like you to consider one thing. When Keynes was pressed to defend his ideals, he would often come to one final defense. He would simply say that "doing something was better than doing nothing". I suppose this could be true for those who struggle mightily during economic turmoil. To see that "something" is being tried, rather than nothing at all. But I'm of the opinion that when the "something" reaches levels the world has never seen, the old axiom "doing more harm than good" is likely to be the end result. It seems to me that a term used principally in medical ethics would also suit finance quite well. That is "Primum non nocere", or "first, do no harm". I fear great harm is being done with the extraordinary actions of the Fed as well as most other central banks around the world.

 

Hayek used a very interesting comparison in this lecture to make his point. He compared what we know of the physical sciences, to that of what economists claim to know about the "science" of economics. At your leisure, I think you'll find this an intriguing read.

 

Randy    

Prize Lecture

Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, December 11, 1974

Friedrich August von Hayek

The Pretence of Knowledge

The particular occasion of this lecture, combined with the chief practical problem which economists have to face today, have made the choice of its topic almost inevitable. On the one hand the still recent establishment of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science marks a significant step in the process by which, in the opinion of the general public, economics has been conceded some of the dignity and prestige of the physical sciences. On the other hand, the economists are at this moment called upon to say how to extricate the free world from the serious threat of accelerating inflation which, it must be admitted, has been brought about by policies which the majority of economists recommended and even urged governments to pursue. We have indeed at the moment little cause for pride: as a profession we have made a mess of things.

It seems to me that this failure of the economists to guide policy more successfully is closely connected with their propensity to imitate as closely as possible the procedures of the brilliantly successful physical sciences - an attempt which in our field may lead to outright error. It is an approach which has come to be described as the "scientistic" attitude - an attitude which, as I defined it some thirty years ago, "is decidedly unscientific in the true sense of the word, since it involves a mechanical and uncritical application of habits of thought to fields different from those in which they have been formed."1 I want today to begin by explaining how some of the gravest errors of recent economic policy are a direct consequence of this scientistic error.

The theory which has been guiding monetary and financial policy during the last thirty years, and which I contend is largely the product of such a mistaken conception of the proper scientific procedure, consists in the assertion that there exists a simple positive correlation between total employment and the size of the aggregate demand for goods and services; it leads to the belief that we can permanently assure full employment by maintaining total money expenditure at an appropriate level. Among the various theories advanced to account for extensive unemployment, this is probably the only one in support of which strong quantitative evidence can be adduced. I nevertheless regard it as fundamentally false, and to act upon it, as we now experience, as very harmful.

This brings me to the crucial issue. Unlike the position that exists in the physical sciences, in economics and other disciplines that deal with essentially complex phenomena, the aspects of the events to be accounted for about which we can get quantitative data are necessarily limited and may not include the important ones. While in the physical sciences it is generally assumed, probably with good reason, that any important factor which determines the observed events will itself be directly observable and measurable, in the study of such complex phenomena as the market, which depend on the actions of many individuals, all the circumstances which will determine the outcome of a process, for reasons which I shall explain later, will hardly ever be fully known or measurable. And while in the physical sciences the investigator will be able to measure what, on the basis of a prima facie theory, he thinks important, in the social sciences often that is treated as important which happens to be accessible to measurement. This is sometimes carried to the point where it is demanded that our theories must be formulated in such terms that they refer only to measurable magnitudes.

It can hardly be denied that such a demand quite arbitrarily limits the facts which are to be admitted as possible causes of the events which occur in the real world. This view, which is often quite naively accepted as required by scientific procedure, has some rather paradoxical consequences. We know: of course, with regard to the market and similar social structures, a great many facts which we cannot measure and on which indeed we have only some very imprecise and general information. And because the effects of these facts in any particular instance cannot be confirmed by quantitative evidence, they are simply disregarded by those sworn to admit only what they regard as scientific evidence: they thereupon happily proceed on the fiction that the factors which they can measure are the only ones that are relevant.

The correlation between aggregate demand and total employment, for instance, may only be approximate, but as it is the only one on which we have quantitative data, it is accepted as the only causal connection that counts. On this standard there may thus well exist better "scientific" evidence for a false theory, which will be accepted because it is more "scientific", than for a valid explanation, which is rejected because there is no sufficient quantitative evidence for it.

Let me illustrate this by a brief sketch of what I regard as the chief actual cause of extensive unemployment - an account which will also explain why such unemployment cannot be lastingly cured by the inflationary policies recommended by the now fashionable theory. This correct explanation appears to me to be the existence of discrepancies between the distribution of demand among the different goods and services and the allocation of labour and other resources among the production of those outputs. We possess a fairly good "qualitative" knowledge of the forces by which a correspondence between demand and supply in the different sectors of the economic system is brought about, of the conditions under which it will be achieved, and of the factors likely to prevent such an adjustment. The separate steps in the account of this process rely on facts of everyday experience, and few who take the trouble to follow the argument will question the validity of the factual assumptions, or the logical correctness of the conclusions drawn from them. We have indeed good reason to believe that unemployment indicates that the structure of relative prices and wages has been distorted (usually by monopolistic or governmental price fixing), and that to restore equality between the demand and the supply of labour in all sectors changes of relative prices and some transfers of labour will be necessary.

But when we are asked for quantitative evidence for the particular structure of prices and wages that would be required in order to assure a smooth continuous sale of the products and services offered, we must admit that we have no such information. We know, in other words, the general conditions in which what we call, somewhat misleadingly, an equilibrium will establish itself: but we never know what the particular prices or wages are which would exist if the market were to bring about such an equilibrium. We can merely say what the conditions are in which we can expect the market to establish prices and wages at which demand will equal supply. But we can never produce statistical information which would show how much the prevailing prices and wages deviate from those which would secure a continuous sale of the current supply of labour. Though this account of the causes of unemployment is an empirical theory, in the sense that it might be proved false, e.g. if, with a constant money supply, a general increase of wages did not lead to unemployment, it is certainly not the kind of theory which we could use to obtain specific numerical predictions concerning the rates of wages, or the distribution of labour, to be expected.

Why should we, however, in economics, have to plead ignorance of the sort of facts on which, in the case of a physical theory, a scientist would certainly be expected to give precise information? It is probably not surprising that those impressed by the example of the physical sciences should find this position very unsatisfactory and should insist on the standards of proof which they find there. The reason for this state of affairs is the fact, to which I have already briefly referred, that the social sciences, like much of biology but unlike most fields of the physical sciences, have to deal with structures of essential complexity, i.e. with structures whose characteristic properties can be exhibited only by models made up of relatively large numbers of variables. Competition, for instance, is a process which will produce certain results only if it proceeds among a fairly large number of acting persons.

In some fields, particularly where problems of a similar kind arise in the physical sciences, the difficulties can be overcome by using, instead of specific information about the individual elements, data about the relative frequency, or the probability, of the occurrence of the various distinctive properties of the elements. But this is true only where we have to deal with what has been called by Dr. Warren Weaver (formerly of the Rockefeller Foundation), with a distinction which ought to be much more widely understood, "phenomena of unorganized complexity," in contrast to those "phenomena of organized complexity" with which we have to deal in the social sciences.2 Organized complexity here means that the character of the structures showing it depends not only on the properties of the individual elements of which they are composed, and the relative frequency with which they occur, but also on the manner in which the individual elements are connected with each other. In the explanation of the working of such structures we can for this reason not replace the information about the individual elements by statistical information, but require full information about each element if from our theory we are to derive specific predictions about individual events. Without such specific information about the individual elements we shall be confined to what on another occasion I have called mere pattern predictions - predictions of some of the general attributes of the structures that will form themselves, but not containing specific statements about the individual elements of which the structures will be made up.3

This is particularly true of our theories accounting for the determination of the systems of relative prices and wages that will form themselves on a wellfunctioning market. Into the determination of these prices and wages there will enter the effects of particular information possessed by every one of the participants in the market process - a sum of facts which in their totality cannot be known to the scientific observer, or to any other single brain. It is indeed the source of the superiority of the market order, and the reason why, when it is not suppressed by the powers of government, it regularly displaces other types of order, that in the resulting allocation of resources more of the knowledge of particular facts will be utilized which exists only dispersed among uncounted persons, than any one person can possess. But because we, the observing scientists, can thus never know all the determinants of such an order, and in consequence also cannot know at which particular structure of prices and wages demand would everywhere equal supply, we also cannot measure the deviations from that order; nor can we statistically test our theory that it is the deviations from that "equilibrium" system of prices and wages which make it impossible to sell some of the products and services at the prices at which they are offered.

Before I continue with my immediate concern, the effects of all this on the employment policies currently pursued, allow me to define more specifically the inherent limitations of our numerical knowledge which are so often overlooked. I want to do this to avoid giving the impression that I generally reject the mathematical method in economics. I regard it in fact as the great advantage of the mathematical technique that it allows us to describe, by means of algebraic equations, the general character of a pattern even where we are ignorant of the numerical values which will determine its particular manifestation. We could scarcely have achieved that comprehensive picture of the mutual interdependencies of the different events in a market without this algebraic technique. It has led to the illusion, however, that we can use this technique for the determination and prediction of the numerical values of those magnitudes; and this has led to a vain search for quantitative or numerical constants. This happened in spite of the fact that the modern founders of mathematical economics had no such illusions. It is true that their systems of equations describing the pattern of a market equilibrium are so framed that if we were able to fill in all the blanks of the abstract formulae, i.e. if we knew all the parameters of these equations, we could calculate the prices and quantities of all commodities and services sold. But, as Vilfredo Pareto, one of the founders of this theory, clearly stated, its purpose cannot be "to arrive at a numerical calculation of prices", because, as he said, it would be "absurd" to assume that we could ascertain all the data.4 Indeed, the chief point was already seen by those remarkable anticipators of modern economics, the Spanish schoolmen of the sixteenth century, who emphasized that what they called pretium mathematicum, the mathematical price, depended on so many particular circumstances that it could never be known to man but was known only to God.5 I sometimes wish that our mathematical economists would take this to heart. I must confess that I still doubt whether their search for measurable magnitudes has made significant contributions to our theoretical understanding of economic phenomena - as distinct from their value as a description of particular situations. Nor am I prepared to accept the excuse that this branch of research is still very young: Sir William Petty, the founder of econometrics, was after all a somewhat senior colleague of Sir Isaac Newton in the Royal Society!

There may be few instances in which the superstition that only measurable magnitudes can be important has done positive harm in the economic field: but the present inflation and employment problems are a very serious one. Its effect has been that what is probably the true cause of extensive unemployment has been disregarded by the scientistically minded majority of economists, because its operation could not be confirmed by directly observable relations between measurable magnitudes, and that an almost exclusive concentration on quantitatively measurable surface phenomena has produced a policy which has made matters worse.

It has, of course, to be readily admitted that the kind of theory which I regard as the true explanation of unemployment is a theory of somewhat limited content because it allows us to make only very general predictions of the kind of events which we must expect in a given situation. But the effects on policy of the more ambitious constructions have not been very fortunate and I confess that I prefer true but imperfect knowledge, even if it leaves much indetermined and unpredictable, to a pretence of exact knowledge that is likely to be false. The credit which the apparent conformity with recognized scientific standards can gain for seemingly simple but false theories may, as the present instance shows, have grave consequences.

In fact, in the case discussed, the very measures which the dominant "macro-economic" theory has recommended as a remedy for unemployment, namely the increase of aggregate demand, have become a cause of a very extensive misallocation of resources which is likely to make later large-scale unemployment inevitable. The continuous injection of additional amounts of money at points of the economic system where it creates a temporary demand which must cease when the increase of the quantity of money stops or slows down, together with the expectation of a continuing rise of prices, draws labour and other resources into employments which can last only so long as the increase of the quantity of money continues at the same rate - or perhaps even only so long as it continues to accelerate at a given rate. What this policy has produced is not so much a level of employment that could not have been brought about in other ways, as a distribution of employment which cannot be indefinitely maintained and which after some time can be maintained only by a rate of inflation which would rapidly lead to a disorganisation of all economic activity. The fact is that by a mistaken theoretical view we have been led into a precarious position in which we cannot prevent substantial unemployment from re-appearing; not because, as this view is sometimes misrepresented, this unemployment is deliberately brought about as a means to combat inflation, but because it is now bound to occur as a deeply regrettable but inescapable consequence of the mistaken policies of the past as soon as inflation ceases to accelerate.

I must, however, now leave these problems of immediate practical importance which I have introduced chiefly as an illustration of the momentous consequences that may follow from errors concerning abstract problems of the philosophy of science. There is as much reason to be apprehensive about the long run dangers created in a much wider field by the uncritical acceptance of assertions which have the appearance of being scientific as there is with regard to the problems I have just discussed. What I mainly wanted to bring out by the topical illustration is that certainly in my field, but I believe also generally in the sciences of man, what looks superficially like the most scientific procedure is often the most unscientific, and, beyond this, that in these fields there are definite limits to what we can expect science to achieve. This means that to entrust to science - or to deliberate control according to scientific principles - more than scientific method can achieve may have deplorable effects. The progress of the natural sciences in modern times has of course so much exceeded all expectations that any suggestion that there may be some limits to it is bound to arouse suspicion. Especially all those will resist such an insight who have hoped that our increasing power of prediction and control, generally regarded as the characteristic result of scientific advance, applied to the processes of society, would soon enable us to mould society entirely to our liking. It is indeed true that, in contrast to the exhilaration which the discoveries of the physical sciences tend to produce, the insights which we gain from the study of society more often have a dampening effect on our aspirations; and it is perhaps not surprising that the more impetuous younger members of our profession are not always prepared to accept this. Yet the confidence in the unlimited power of science is only too often based on a false belief that the scientific method consists in the application of a ready-made technique, or in imitating the form rather than the substance of scientific procedure, as if one needed only to follow some cooking recipes to solve all social problems. It sometimes almost seems as if the techniques of science were more easily learnt than the thinking that shows us what the problems are and how to approach them.

The conflict between what in its present mood the public expects science to achieve in satisfaction of popular hopes and what is really in its power is a serious matter because, even if the true scientists should all recognize the limitations of what they can do in the field of human affairs, so long as the public expects more there will always be some who will pretend, and perhaps honestly believe, that they can do more to meet popular demands than is really in their power. It is often difficult enough for the expert, and certainly in many instances impossible for the layman, to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate claims advanced in the name of science. The enormous publicity recently given by the media to a report pronouncing in the name of science on The Limits to Growth, and the silence of the same media about the devastating criticism this report has received from the competent experts6, must make one feel somewhat apprehensive about the use to which the prestige of science can be put. But it is by no means only in the field of economics that far-reaching claims are made on behalf of a more scientific direction of all human activities and the desirability of replacing spontaneous processes by "conscious human control". If I am not mistaken, psychology, psychiatry and some branches of sociology, not to speak about the so-called philosophy of history, are even more affected by what I have called the scientistic prejudice, and by specious claims of what science can achieve.7

If we are to safeguard the reputation of science, and to prevent the arrogation of knowledge based on a superficial similarity of procedure with that of the physical sciences, much effort will have to be directed toward debunking such arrogations, some of which have by now become the vested interests of established university departments. We cannot be grateful enough to such modern philosophers of science as Sir Karl Popper for giving us a test by which we can distinguish between what we may accept as scientific and what not - a test which I am sure some doctrines now widely accepted as scientific would not pass. There are some special problems, however, in connection with those essentially complex phenomena of which social structures are so important an instance, which make me wish to restate in conclusion in more general terms the reasons why in these fields not only are there only absolute obstacles to the prediction of specific events, but why to act as if we possessed scientific knowledge enabling us to transcend them may itself become a serious obstacle to the advance of the human intellect.

The chief point we must remember is that the great and rapid advance of the physical sciences took place in fields where it proved that explanation and prediction could be based on laws which accounted for the observed phenomena as functions of comparatively few variables - either particular facts or relative frequencies of events. This may even be the ultimate reason why we single out these realms as "physical" in contrast to those more highly organized structures which I have here called essentially complex phenomena. There is no reason why the position must be the same in the latter as in the former fields. The difficulties which we encounter in the latter are not, as one might at first suspect, difficulties about formulating theories for the explanation of the observed events - although they cause also special difficulties about testing proposed explanations and therefore about eliminating bad theories. They are due to the chief problem which arises when we apply our theories to any particular situation in the real world. A theory of essentially complex phenomena must refer to a large number of particular facts; and to derive a prediction from it, or to test it, we have to ascertain all these particular facts. Once we succeeded in this there should be no particular difficulty about deriving testable predictions - with the help of modern computers it should be easy enough to insert these data into the appropriate blanks of the theoretical formulae and to derive a prediction. The real difficulty, to the solution of which science has little to contribute, and which is sometimes indeed insoluble, consists in the ascertainment of the particular facts.

A simple example will show the nature of this difficulty. Consider some ball game played by a few people of approximately equal skill. If we knew a few particular facts in addition to our general knowledge of the ability of the individual players, such as their state of attention, their perceptions and the state of their hearts, lungs, muscles etc. at each moment of the game, we could probably predict the outcome. Indeed, if we were familiar both with the game and the teams we should probably have a fairly shrewd idea on what the outcome will depend. But we shall of course not be able to ascertain those facts and in consequence the result of the game will be outside the range of the scientifically predictable, however well we may know what effects particular events would have on the result of the game. This does not mean that we can make no predictions at all about the course of such a game. If we know the rules of the different games we shall, in watching one, very soon know which game is being played and what kinds of actions we can expect and what kind not. But our capacity to predict will be confined to such general characteristics of the events to be expected and not include the capacity of predicting particular individual events.

This corresponds to what I have called earlier the mere pattern predictions to which we are increasingly confined as we penetrate from the realm in which relatively simple laws prevail into the range of phenomena where organized complexity rules. As we advance we find more and more frequently that we can in fact ascertain only some but not all the particular circumstances which determine the outcome of a given process; and in consequence we are able to predict only some but not all the properties of the result we have to expect. Often all that we shall be able to predict will be some abstract characteristic of the pattern that will appear - relations between kinds of elements about which individually we know very little. Yet, as I am anxious to repeat, we will still achieve predictions which can be falsified and which therefore are of empirical significance.

Of course, compared with the precise predictions we have learnt to expect in the physical sciences, this sort of mere pattern predictions is a second best with which one does not like to have to be content. Yet the danger of which I want to warn is precisely the belief that in order to have a claim to be accepted as scientific it is necessary to achieve more. This way lies charlatanism and worse. To act on the belief that we possess the knowledge and the power which enable us to shape the processes of society entirely to our liking, knowledge which in fact we do not possess, is likely to make us do much harm. In the physical sciences there may be little objection to trying to do the impossible; one might even feel that one ought not to discourage the over-confident because their experiments may after all produce some new insights. But in the social field the erroneous belief that the exercise of some power would have beneficial consequences is likely to lead to a new power to coerce other men being conferred on some authority. Even if such power is not in itself bad, its exercise is likely to impede the functioning of those spontaneous ordering forces by which, without understanding them, man is in fact so largely assisted in the pursuit of his aims. We are only beginning to understand on how subtle a communication system the functioning of an advanced industrial society is based - a communications system which we call the market and which turns out to be a more efficient mechanism for digesting dispersed information than any that man has deliberately designed.

If man is not to do more harm than good in his efforts to improve the social order, he will have to learn that in this, as in all other fields where essential complexity of an organized kind prevails, he cannot acquire the full knowledge which would make mastery of the events possible. He will therefore have to use what knowledge he can achieve, not to shape the results as the craftsman shapes his handiwork, but rather to cultivate a growth by providing the appropriate environment, in the manner in which the gardener does this for his plants. There is danger in the exuberant feeling of ever growing power which the advance of the physical sciences has engendered and which tempts man to try, "dizzy with success", to use a characteristic phrase of early communism, to subject not only our natural but also our human environment to the control of a human will. The recognition of the insuperable limits to his knowledge ought indeed to teach the student of society a lesson of humility which should guard him against becoming an accomplice in men's fatal striving to control society - a striving which makes him not only a tyrant over his fellows, but which may well make him the destroyer of a civilization which no brain has designed but which has grown from the free efforts of millions of individuals.

 


 

1. "Scientism and the Study of Society", Economica, vol. IX, no. 35, August 1942, reprinted in The Counter-Revolution of Science, Glencoe, Ill., 1952, p. 15 of this reprint.

2. Warren Weaver, "A Quarter Century in the Natural Sciences", The Rockefeller Foundation Annual Report 1958, chapter I, "Science and Complexity".

3. See my essay "The Theory of Complex Phenomena" in The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy. Essays in Honor of K.R. Popper, ed. M. Bunge, New York 1964, and reprinted (with additions) in my Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, London and Chicago 1967.

4. V. Pareto, Manuel d'économie politique, 2nd. ed., Paris 1927, pp. 223-4.

5. See, e.g., Luis Molina, De iustitia et iure, Cologne 1596-1600, tom. II, disp. 347, no. 3, and particularly Johannes de Lugo, Disputationum de iustitia et iure tomus secundus, Lyon 1642, disp. 26, sect. 4, no. 40.

6. See The Limits to Growth: A Report of the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind, New York 1972; for a systematic examination of this by a competent economist cf. Wilfred Beckerman, In Defence of Economic Growth, London 1974, and, for a list of earlier criticisms by experts, Gottfried Haberler, Economic Growth and Stability, Los Angeles 1974, who rightly calls their effect "devastating".

7. I have given some illustrations of these tendencies in other fields in my inaugural lecture as Visiting Professor at the University of Salzburg, Die Irrtümer des Konstruktivismus und die Grundlagen legitimer Kritik gesellschaftlicher Gebilde, Munich 1970, now reissued for the Walter Eucken Institute, at Freiburg i.Brg. by J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen 1975.

From Nobel Lectures, Economics 1969-1980, Editor Assar Lindbeck, World Scientific Publishing Co., Singapore, 1992

 

 

Randy Woodward



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